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Executive summary
Excess liquidity (defined as all kinds of commercial bank deposits held by the 
Eurosystem minus the minimum reserve requirements) in the euro area exceeded €1,900 
billion, or 17 percent of euro-area GDP, in September 2018. Holding such excess liquidity is 
costly for commercial banks, given that the currently negative (-0.4 percent) deposit facility 
interest rate applies on excess liquidity holdings. The current stock of excess liquidity implies 
an annual €7.6 billion cost in total for those banks that hold this liquidity. More generally, 
the European Central Bank’s negative deposit interest rate and asset purchases further 
reduced market interest rates, with a negative impact on banks’ net interest income and thus 
profitability. This could incentivise a reach-for-yield race among banks. Additionally, the 
access to liquidity eased significantly and removed the liquidity constraint for most banks’ 
lending activities. These factors might incentivise banks to engage in risky lending in order to 
improve their profits. This in turn might create financial stability risks.
We clarify the definition of excess liquidity, to highlight the reasons why such a large 
amount of it is being held, and to assess its financial stability implications.
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Key findings
• Excess liquidity was practically zero before September 2008, and has fluctuated since 
then, with a peak of close to €1,000 billion in 2012 followed by a major reduction, and an 
even more significant increase starting in March 2015. The reason behind the 2008-2012 
increase was banks’ demand for liquidity because of the break-down of normal interbank 
market operations and heightened risks. This demand was satisfied by the ECB and even 
incentivised by the ECB’s generous lending facilities. Since March 2015 the ECB’s ex-
panded asset market programme (APP) automatically creates excess liquidity, unless it is 
converted to cash or compulsory reserves because of an increase in banking activities;
• We do not find increased conversion of excess liquidity to cash, probably because the cost 
of holding cash is higher than the negative interest rate to be paid after excess liquidity; 
• Excess liquidity is highly concentrated in a few countries, and in a few banks within coun-
tries, highlighting that it is not a widespread issue throughout the euro area;
• Excess liquidity in the euro area is in fact much lower than related indicators in Japan, 
Switzerland and the United States, and also somewhat lower than in the United Kingdom;
• While the direct marginal impact on bank profits of the ECB’s negative deposit rate levied 
on excess liquidity is negative, the overall impact of the negative rate and other monetary 
policy measures, such as asset purchases, could be positive. Monetary policy measures 
can increase asset prices and improve the economic situation, which enhances the credit 
quality of bank assets, thereby improving bank profitability. Empirical research has found 
that the overall impact of monetary policy on bank profitability has been positive;
• Most euro-area banks are still in the deleveraging phase of the financial cycle, implying 
that their risk appetites might be limited;
• Risk-weighted assets relative to total assets are declining (implying lower riskiness) or 
remain broadly stable in most euro-area countries, suggesting that bank balance sheets 
have not become risker. Compositional changes, upgrades to bank client credit ratings, 
fewer non-performing loans (NPLs), the deleveraging process, cautious internal risk 
limitation measures and stricter financial regulation might contribute to the decline in 
risk-weighted assets;
• Home bias in loans granted and securities purchased by banks has increased in most 
countries, highlighting that banks have become more exposed to developments in their 
home countries, which is a risk factor;
• Bank lending growth remains subdued with the exceptions of Belgium and Slovakia, 
suggesting that in the majority of euro-area countries, the expansion of housing loans 
remains well below values observed during earlier housing booms;
• House prices have started to pick up in a number of euro-area countries, but to a lesser 
extent than house price increases during earlier housing booms, with the exception of 
Ireland. However, the acceleration in house prices requires attention from macropruden-
tial authorities;
• Bank credit standards for household loans have been tightened in most countries that ex-
perience rapid house prices increases, suggesting that banks aim at containing their risks;
• Our overview of macroprudential reports issued by relevant authorities suggests that 
the overall risk to financial stability remains low, but in certain countries the accelerated 
increase in house prices is already in the spotlight;
• We argue that monetary policy tools are ill-suited to fostering financial stability;
• Finally, we note that while the winding down of excess liquidity is a remote prospect at 
the moment, when this happens, banks that rely heavily on excess liquidity to meet the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirement might face problems, which could have 
financial stability implications.
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1 Introduction
The European Central Bank’s various non-standard monetary policy tools, such as large-
scale liquidity provision through various long-term refinancing instruments, asset purchases 
and the adoption of a negative deposit rate on the ECB’s deposit facility for commercial 
banks, likely had a positive impact on economic developments in the euro area. Such ECB 
measures also supported the banking system both directly (via, for example, cheap financing) 
and indirectly through the better economic outlook, which impacts banks through various 
channels. Partly because of ECB measures, lending by euro-area banks also started to pick up 
from zero percent loan growth in early 2014 to 3 percent in the first half of 2018 – a rate that is 
still well below pre-crisis credit growth rates.  
At the same time, banks’ various deposits and reserves held at ECB have increased to 
unforeseen levels, which is actually costly for banks: excess reserves and deposits are subject 
to the ECB’s deposit facility interest rate, which, at the time of writing, is negative at -0.4 
percent. A direct impact of this negative interest rate is a deterioration of bank profits. Yet 
this direct cost is not the only factor influencing bank profitability – and in fact it is not the 
most important factor. Low interest rates and asset purchases tend to reduce the loan/deposit 
interest rate differential and the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates, and 
thereby squeeze bank profits. More generally, low nominal interest rates might incentivise 
agents, including banks, to take more risks. These direct and indirect effects and the abundant 
liquidity might trigger riskier lending behaviour from banks1. 
However, the right question, in our view, is not whether banks lend to riskier borrowers, 
but the degree of risk. If banks only lend to super-safe borrowers, they are unlikely to face 
defaults, but at the same time economic growth might be too slow. Banks should also deal 
with, for example, start-ups and innovators, which might be riskier, but also offer the potential 
of fast growth. Therefore, the right question, in our view, is whether banks take undue risks 
that might endanger financial stability.
In this Policy Contribution, we clarify what excess liquidity is and argue that it is not 
a good indicator of whether banks’ have more incentives in risk taking. We then look at 
indicators that might signal that bank lending in the euro area creates undue risks. We 
conclude that this is unlikely to be the case.
2 Excess liquidity
While excess liquidity in the euro area was close to zero before 2008, it grew to exceed €1,900 
billion by September 2018 and is still on an upward moving trend. The current value of excess 
liquidity is very large as it amounts to about 17 percent of euro-area annual GDP. Before 
assessing the potential impacts of excess liquidity, we clarify its notion, put euro-area values 
into perspective in relation to Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and United States, and 
analyse the reasons for hoarding so much excess liquidity and its distribution across countries 
and banks.
2.1 Liquidity and excess reserves
An asset is regarded as ‘liquid’ if it can be used quickly for payments. For example, a natural 
person can withdraw cash from her/his current account (sight deposit) held at a retail bank 
without any notice or penalty, so a current account is liquid. However, a house is not really 
liquid because selling a house and converting it to cash takes time.
1   The econometric analysis in Demiralp et al (2017) concluded that the negative ECB deposit interest rate led to 
more lending by banks.
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Commercial banks also hold various liquid assets. For example, a government bond is 
rather liquid because (in most cases) it can be sold and converted to money quickly. But 
loans granted by a bank are not liquid because they are difficult to sell. The most liquid assets 
that commercial banks can hold is reserves held at the central bank. These can be used to 
satisfy minimum reserve requirements (where such requirements exists), converted to cash 
if customers wish to take out their bank deposits, and transferred to other banks to settle 
payments.
Central bank money consists of cash or ‘currency in circulation’ (banknotes and coins) 
and commercial banks’ reserves (ie deposits) held at the central bank (see eg Box 1 in Baldo 
et al, 2017). These are liabilities of the central bank and assets of their owners, ie commercial 
banks, other entities and natural persons holding cash, while banks’ reserves are obviously 
the assets of commercial banks2. The central bank is in full control of central bank money, ie 
the sum of these two items. But the central bank does not control the distribution of the two 
components, since banks can change their deposits at the central bank to cash. The central 
bank also does not control which banks hold central bank money. An individual bank can 
reduce its central bank money holdings, for example by lending to other banks, purchasing 
assets or transferring funds on behalf of its clients, but the banking system as a whole cannot: 
the central bank money always ends up with another bank and thus in an account at the 
central bank. 
Figure 1: Currency in circulation in the euro area (%GDP), 1999Q1-2018Q2
Source: Bruegel based on the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse, BSI.M.U2.N.V.L10.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (Currency in circulation) and 
MNA.Q.N.U2.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ._Z._Z._Z.EUR.V.N (quarterly GDP). Note: data refers to the euro area (changing composition), at current prices, 
non-adjusted. In order to show the share of cash in annual GDP, we multiply quarterly GDP by 4.
In terms of converting banks’ reserves to cash, one might expect that as a result of low 
and even negative deposit rates, cash holdings go up. This is because banks might not wish 
to pay the penalty of the negative deposit rate, while commercial bank customers might 
decide to hold more cash when they face very low deposit rates3. When interest rates are low 
globally, people and companies outside the euro area might also hold more euro cash. But 
2   In addition to cash and bank reserves, central bank liabilities also include an item designated by the ECB as “au-
tonomous factors”, such as deposits by governments and other account holders with the central bank. Autonomous 
factors also influence central bank liquidity. 
3   Overall, retail banks did not impose negative interest rates on their customers, though many banks cut the interest 
rate on current accounts to zero and increased other fees.
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the data does not suggest any unusual increase in euro cash holdings recently. Figure 1 shows 
that the currency in circulation as a share of euro-area GDP has been on an upward trend 
since 2002 – for which there must be structural reasons. It is interesting to observe that there 
was a distinct increase in the cash/GDP ratio at the beginning of the financial crisis (from 
2008Q3 to 2009Q2), which is probably explained by agents turning to cash for safety reasons. 
After 2009Q2, the steady increase in the cash/GDP ratio resumed. This trend has continued 
since the negative deposit rate was introduced in 2014, yet the growth rate has slowed and 
in 2016-18 the ratio of cash to GDP has remained broadly stable, even though ECB deposit 
rates became more negative. This suggests that there is no increased substitution by cash of 
negative interest-bearing bank deposits at the ECB. It is likely that the cost of storing cash is 
higher than the negative interest rates banks have to pay on their ECB deposits.
In the euro area and in many (but not all) countries outside the euro area, banks must 
hold a certain share (currently 1 percent) of certain liabilities, mainly customers’ deposits, 
as reserves at the central bank. Traditionally, such reserves serve as a guarantee that banks 
will be able to obtain cash from the central bank in case depositors wish to withdraw their 
deposits. The amount of reserves held at the central bank in excess of the minimum reserve 
requirement is considered as ‘excess liquidity’ (see, for example, ECB, 2017).
In many countries, banks have a single account at the central bank, but in the euro area, 
banks’ excess liquidity can be held in three accounts: 
• Current account4: banks must deposit sufficient funds in their current account at the ECB 
to meet the minimum reserve requirements (MRR); the MRR should not be met each day, 
but on average over six weeks during the so-called maintenance period (MP);
• The ECB has a deposit facility for banks; and
• The ECB has a fixed-term deposit instrument for certain monetary policy purposes, such 
as sterilising the assets purchased under the Securities Markets Programme5.
Excess liquidity was practically zero before summer 2008, after which there were a number 
of ups and downs, with a major peak close to €1,000 billion in 2012, which fell to below €100 
billion by mid-2014 (Figure 2). There has been a steady increase since early 2015 and the 
September 2018 value of excess liquidity surpassed €1,900 billion.
Figure 2 allows us to study the components of excess liquidity. In the past, excess reserves 
did not earn interest but banks received interest for the money they placed in the deposit 
facility. Therefore, before the deposit rate was cut to zero in 2012, banks hoarded all their 
excess liquidity in the deposit facility and tried to keep excess reserves to zero. But when the 
deposit facility interest rate was reduced to zero in 2012, banks switched slightly more than 
half of their deposits to the current account and therefore increased their excess reserves. 
Consequently, banks do not have to worry about keeping exactly the minimum amount in 
their current account with the ECB. Since the ECB decided to introduce a negative rate on 
the deposit facility in 2014, it treats the current account balances (in excess of the minimum 
reserve requirement) and the deposit facility in the same way, and consequently banks have 
remained indifferent on whether to hold their excess liquidity in their current account or in 
the deposit facility. Since the sterilisation of SMP holdings was suspended in 2014 and as no 
similar measures have been introduced, banks’ deposits in the fixed-term deposit fell to zero.
4   Banks’ current accounts at the ECB should not be confused with the current account of the balance of payments. 
5   In May 2010, the ECB launched the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) to improve the transmission of monetary 
policy. Under this programme, it purchased the government bonds of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Since the goal was to support monetary transmission and not to implement a monetary stimulus, the bonds pur-
chases were sterilised, ie the Eurosystem re-absorbed the liquidity provided through the SMP by means of weekly 
liquidity-absorbing operations until June 2014, when the ECB suspended this sterilisation (see the ‘Terminated pro-
grammes’ section at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html). The banks’ depos-
its in this weekly deposit account would otherwise have been excess reserves or deposits held on the deposit facility; 
see footnote 3 of Baldo et al (2017). 
6 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚16  | September  2018
Figure 2: Banks’ excess liquidity and its three components, along with the ECB’s 
deposit facility interest rate, January 2007 – August 2018
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (deposit facility: ILM.M.U2.C.L020200.U2.EUR, fixed term deposits: 
ILM.M.U2.C.L020300.U2.EUR, current account: ILM.M.U2.C.L020100.U2.EUR, reserve base: BSI.M.U2.N.R.LR0.A.1.A1.0000.Z01.E, deposit 
rate: FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.DFR.LEV). Note: Banks’ excess reserves are the reserves banks hold in their current accounts with the ECB minus 
the minimum reserve requirement. Because of the huge volatility of daily data, we use a 30-day moving average. Excess liquidity is the 
sum of excess reserves and the amounts help at the deposit facility and fixed term deposits.
2.2 Banks’ reserves at the central bank: a global comparison
The €1,900 billion euro-area excess liquidity amount sounds like a huge number. It is 
therefore useful to view euro-area excess liquidity from a global perspective. There is no 
reserve requirement in some countries (eg the United Kingdom) and therefore excess 
reserves and excess liquidity cannot be calculated for these countries. We therefore show 
ratios of total reserves to total banking system assets (Figure 3). For the ECB, we consider all 
three relevant accounts banks hold at the ECB, as discussed in the previous section.
Before the crisis, total bank reserves were below 1 percent of total banking assets in the 
euro area, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, and also in Japan before 
2002 and in 2006-2008. From 2002-06, a period when the Bank of Japan had already adopted 
non-standard monetary policy by purchasing assets, reserves of Japanese banks increased to 
about 2-4 percent. 
Since mid-2008, however, there has been a substantial increase in banks’ reserves/asset 
ratios in all five jurisdictions. In fact, the smallest increase has been observed in the euro area 
(to 6.5 percent), suggesting that the level of excess liquidity in the euro area is not exceptional 
and in fact is much lower than in Japan (30 percent) or the peak in the United States (23 
percent) or the latest value in Switzerland (15 percent).
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Figure 3: Banks’ total reserves held at the respective central bank, as a share of 
total banking system assets, January 2000 – July 2018
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (deposit facility: ILM.M.U2.C.L020200.U2.EUR, current account: 
ILM.M.U2.C.L020100.U2.EUR, Fixed-term deposits: ILM.M.U2.C.L020300.U2.EUR, total assets: BSI.M.U2.N.A.T00.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E); 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (total reserves: RESBALNS, total assets: B1151NDMDM); Bank of England (total reserves: LPMBL22, total 
assets via ECB: DD.A.GB.TA_DBG.PGDP.4F_N); Bank of Japan (total reserves: MD07’MAREM1, total assets: BS02’FAABK_FAAB2DBEAS); Swiss 
National Bank (reserves: EPB@SNB.snbbipo{GB} and EPB@SNB.snbbipo{GBI}, total assets: BSTA@SNB.MONA_U.BIL.AKT.TOT{U,T,T,A40}).
Naturally, increased banks’ reserves coincide with increased central bank balance sheets 
(Figure 4) in this respect, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Japan stand out with a balance 
sheet surpassing 100 percent of GDP. The euro-area value of 41 percent is the third highest. 
Figure 4: Central bank balance sheet, January 2006 – August 2018
Source: Bruegel based on balance sheet data: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (BoJ: JPNASSETS, ECB: ECBASSETS, FED: WALCL, BoE: 
UKASSETS), Bank of England (RPQB75A) and Swiss National Bank (EPB@SNB.snbbipo{T0}); GDP: IMF (WEO), Eurostat [nama_10_gdp] and 
Swiss National Bank (EPB@SNB.gdpap{WMF,BBIP}).
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2.3 Drivers of banks’ reserves in the euro area
Before the global financial crisis, the ECB implemented neutral liquidity conditions – just 
enough for banks to satisfy reserve requirements. It estimated the liquidity needs of the 
banking system each week and provided that amount of money in the form of loans to banks. 
The banks competed for these loans in an auction and the ECB ensured that the loans met the 
needs of the banking system as a whole. Once in the system, the liquidity was redistributed 
between the banks – via interbank lending – according to individual needs. As Figure 2 shows, 
excess liquidity was close to zero in this period. 
But the ECB has fundamentally changed its liquidity provision since October 2008, when 
it introduced fixed-rate full allotment (FRFA) refinancing operations instead of the previous 
auctions. Under FRFA, banks can access unlimited reserves against eligible collateral, while 
collateral policy has been loosened by accepting a wider set of, and lower-rated, collateral 
(see Darvas and Merler, 2013). In this way, the ECB has allowed the accumulation of excess 
liquidity and has even incentivised it by making the conditions of its temporary operations 
more generous (eg increasing maturity or reducing the cost). Excess liquidity peaked in 2012, 
followed by a reduction to close to zero by late 2014, after which a huge increase followed.
The drivers of excess liquidity increase were rather different in the 2008-12 and the 
post-2015 periods. In the 2008-12 episode, because of the break down in normal interbank 
banking, excess reserves were driven by banks’ increased demands for liquidity resulting 
from heightened risk, the demand being satisfied by the ECB and even incentivised by the 
generous ECB lending facilities. As financial markets normalised in 2013-14, banks’ demands 
for excess liquidity reduced, resulting in a major decline in excess liquidity from its 2012 peak 
of close to €1,000 billion to less than €100 billion, along with the repayment of the three-year 
long-term refinancing operations. 
Figure 5: Holdings of excess liquidity by country, € billions, 2008 – 2017
Source: Bruegel based on national central banks annual reports, ECB. Note: Holdings of excess reserves and deposit facility is considered, 
but fixed-term deposits are not considered and thereby the Eurosystem total does not correspond to the values indicated on Figure 2.
But since March 2015, the ECB’s expanded asset purchase programmes (APP), which aims 
to increase inflation, has automatically created bank reserves6. This is because the increase 
6   Certainly, the earlier asset purchase programmes, like the first two covered bond purchasing programmes of July 
2009 and November 2011 (resulting in €60 billion purchases in 2009-10 and €16 billion purchases in 2011-12), 
the third covered bond purchasing programme of October 2014 and the November 2014 asset-backed securities 
programme also boosted banks’ reserves, but these programmes were minor compared to the March 2015 public 
sector purchasing programme. See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.
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in assets held by the ECB must be compensated for by increased liabilities – essentially 
either cash or banks’ reserves. We have already shown that the growth rate of currency in 
circulation has not accelerated and has even slowed recently when expressed as a share 
of GDP (Figure 1), and therefore banks’ reserves must go up. To compensate for the asset 
purchase, the ECB credits the reserve accounts of banks held at the ECB. Thus, while in 
2008-12 the increase in excess liquidity was driven by demand for liquidity arising from risk 
factors, since March 2015 the dominant reason has been the supply of reserves, reflecting 
the aim of the ECB to boost inflation.
It is important to highlight that excess reserves are concentrated in a few countries and 
in a few banks within countries. This aspect is crucial in the assessment of the possible 
impacts of excess reserves.
Figure 5 shows that five countries – Germany, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Finland – account for approximately 80-90 percent of total excess liquidity holdings. Italian 
banks held almost zero excess liquidity before 2016 and have started to accumulate some 
excess liquidity more recently.
The uneven distribution of excess liquidity is even more striking when we relate it to 
banking system assets (Figure 6). In Latvia and Finland, this ratio is about 20 percent, a very 
high value compared to, for example, Italy’s 2 percent ratio and Greece’s and Slovakia’s 1 
percent ratio.
Figure 6: Holdings of excess liquidity by country, ratio to banking system assets, 
June 2018
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (banking system assets: BSI.M.*.N.A.T00.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, current account: 
ILM.M.*.N.L020100.U2.EUR, deposit facility: ILM.M.*.N.L020200.U2.EUR, reserve base derived from balance sheet items L21, L22, L23, 
L40 and L41 in BSI.M.*.N.A.*.L.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E).
But excess liquidity holdings are not only uneven across countries, but across banks 
too. Figure 7, taken from Baldo et al (2017), shows that the top 50 excess-liquidity holding 
banks account for about 80 percent of total holdings (blue line), while the share of the 
same 50 banks in minimum reserve requirements is below 40 percent (red line). The 
roll call of banks in the top 50 excess-liquidity holders has changed little: the yellow line 
shows the share of the initial 2012 top 50 banks, which had declined only a little from 80 
percent to 50 percent by 2016. 
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Figure 7: Holdings of excess liquidity by banks, 2012–16
Source: Chart 4 of Baldo et al (2017). 
Baldo et al (2017) studied the reasons for concentration of excess reserve holdings. At the 
country level, the main reason is that the bulk of asset purchases were from counterparties 
whose head institutions were domiciled outside the euro area and whose liquidity is kept in 
accounts in certain euro-area countries, such as Germany and Luxembourg. Additionally, 
non-euro area investors were the main original sellers of euro-area government bonds; these 
investors manage their euro holdings in a few euro-area financial centres. Thus, the same 
factors that explain the build-up of Target-2 balances explain the uneven distribution across 
countries of excess liquidity. 
A further explanation for the concentration could be that banks in lower-rated, and 
therefore higher-yield, countries may reinvest their reserves in sovereign bonds. 
In terms of concentration of excess reserve holdings at the bank level, Baldo et al (2017) 
found, based on a survey of bank treasurers, that the most important factors are the bank 
business model and the related liquidity management strategy, followed by regulatory 
requirements and risk management policies. In particular, the survey showed that investment 
banks and clearing institutions tend to hold more excess liquidity than retail and wholesale 
banks. Smaller banks tend to hold more excess liquidity because they are less equipped 
to reinvest funds in the capital market. Better-capitalised banks tend to hold more excess 
liquidity because they attract more liquidity inflows. Banks with higher non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratios tend to hold more excess liquidity for precautionary reasons. Banking groups 
tend to concentrate excess liquidity at the group head office. And finally, Baldo et al (2017) 
also found that the leverage ratio, the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio 
might hinder the circulation between banks of excess liquidity.
3 Bank lending risks
The current -0.4 percent negative ECB deposit rate applied to more than €1,900 billion in 
banks’ excess liquidity implies a €7.6 billion direct annual cost to those banks that hold the 
excess liquidity. To put this number into perspective, Table 1 compares the implied annual 
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cost by country to profits and bank equity in 2017. Note that the 2017 profits already include 
the direct cost effect of the negative ECB deposit rate.
Table 1: Direct costs from the negative ECB deposit rate and banks’ profits in 2017, 
€ millions
Implied annual 
direct cost of 
negative ECB deposit 
rate (considering 
June 2018 holdings of 
excess liquidity)
Bank 
profits in 
2017 
Implied annual 
direct cost as 
share of bank 
profits in 2017 
in % (Column2/
Column3)
Total bank 
equity in 
2017
Implied 
annual direct 
cost as share 
of total bank 
equity in 
2017 in % 
(Column2/
Column5) 
Austria 117 5,721 2.0 63,969 0.18
Belgium 344 7,812 4.4 75,026 0.46
Cyprus 44 -722 -6.1 5,591 0.78
Estonia 15 599 2.5 3,743 0.40
Finland 364 1,921 18.9 22,106 1.65
France 1,606 29,349 5.5 458,001 0.35
Germany 2,484 10,425 23.8 382,251 0.65
Greece 13 -450 -2.8 34,715 0.04
Ireland 97 4,689 2.1 64,575 0.15
Italy 281 15,293 1.8 215,778 0.13
Latvia 21 210 9.8 3,220 0.64
Lithuania 13 367 3.6 2,565 0.52
Luxembourg 529 3,502 15.1 62,033 0.85
Malta 17 306 5.6 3,542 0.48
Netherlands 754 13,463 5.6 147,630 0.51
Portugal 54 -1,035 5.2 36,096 0.15
Slovakia 3 347 0.9 5,907 0.06
Slovenia 11 494 2.2 4,971 0.22
Spain 391 18,606 2.1 261,964 0.15
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (current account: ILM.M.*.N.L020100.U2.EUR, deposit facility: 
ILM.M.*.N.L020200.U2.EUR, reserve base derived from balance sheet items L21, L22, L23, L40 and L41 in BSI.M.*.N.A.*.L.1.Z5.0000.
Z01.E; return on equity: CBD2.A.*.W0.11._Z._Z.A.A.I2003._Z._Z._Z._Z._Z._Z.PC, equity: CBD2.A.*.W0.67._Z._Z.A.F.LE000._X.ALL.CA._Z.LE._T.EUR). 
Note: Implied annual costs are calculated based on excess liquidity held by monetary financial institutions in a given country multiplied 
by the deposit facility rate of -0.4 percent; Profits are derived indirectly through the return on equity. 
The direct cost arising from the negative ECB deposit rate is generally small compared 
to the overall profits banks made in 2017, with perhaps the exceptions of Germany and 
Finland, where the cost accounts for about one-quarter and one-fifth of profits, respectively 
(Table 1). As a share of equity, the direct cost of excess liquidity is highest in Finland with 
1.65 percent, followed by 0.85 percent in Luxembourg, 0.78 percent in Cyprus and about 0.65 
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percent in Germany and Latvia. These values are relatively large in our view. However, for 
most other countries, the drag on profit rates is rather small (eg in Italy and Spain it is around 
0.15 percent). Moreover, the negative ECB deposit rate along with other measures such as 
asset purchases have various impacts that might compensate for each other. For example, 
as argued by Gros (2016), Blot and Hubert (2016) and Demertzis and Wolff (2016), these 
measures impact banks’ profits by:  
• Reducing profits because of the direct cost arising from the negative ECB deposit facility 
rate;
• Lowering both short and long-term interest rates, and presumably the spread between 
them, which can reduce the loan-to-deposit interest rate margin, thereby lowering bank 
profits;
• Driving up asset prices, so banks that hold such assets benefit;
• Improving the economic situation and outlook, thereby increasing the credit worthiness 
of bank borrowers, cutting the volume of non-performing loans and thereby loan-loss 
provisions, and creating new lending opportunities, all of which boost bank profits.
Altavilla et al (2017) comprehensively analysed the link between monetary policy and 
bank profits in a low interest rate environment. They concluded that the overall impact of 
monetary policy measures was either muted or even positive for bank profits: a positive 
impact on loan-loss provisions and non-interest income largely offset the negative impact 
on net interest income (including the cost of holding negative excess reserves at the 
Eurosystem)7. Still, beyond the overall muted or positive effect, the direct marginal negative 
effect of negative interest rates might induce banks to invest in risky projects. Furthermore, 
while liquidity was a constraint prior to the ECB’s unconventional measures, large liquidity 
buffers allow banks to expand the issuance of loans more easily and therefore banks could 
be more inclined to reach for additional revenues. And more generally, in a low interest 
rate environment, investors including banks might search for yields and engage in riskier 
business.
We therefore analyse indicators which are informative about possible risk taking by 
banks. We start by looking at the overall financial cycle to see if euro-area banks are still in 
a deleveraging phase, in which case excessive risk taking is less likely. We than analyse the 
overall risks taken by banks, as reflected in risk-weighted assets. We also look at the growth 
rate of lending volumes and the increase in house prices in comparison to earlier episodes 
of house-price bubbles. Finally, we summarise macroprudential reports by the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and national macroprudential authorities. 
3.1 Financial cycle 
The financial cycle has a major impact on banks’ ability and willingness to take risks. In the 
upward phase of the financial cycle, which used to coincide with improved economic outlook, 
banks expand their activities and are open to more risk. But in the deleveraging phase of the 
financial cycle, banks are more cautious and typically work to improve their capital positions 
by reducing their activities and risks. 
As Merler (2015) found, euro-area countries were characterised by divergent financial 
cycles after the launch of the euro, with major implications for macroprudential policy. We 
do not repeat her exercise to precisely measure the dating of the financial cycle, but we show 
the evolution of bank’s balance sheets as a ratio to GDP, which is a good indicator for the cycle 
(Figure 8). 
Most euro-area countries are at time of writing still in a deleveraging phase, with the 
main exception of Slovakia (where bank balance sheets as a share of GDP are expanding), 
and France, Estonia and Lithuania, where this ratio is broadly stable. But in the other fifteen 
euro-area countries bank balance sheets continue to contract and the pace of the contraction 
7   See slide 24 of Rostagno et al (2016). 
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is rather fast in most of these countries. This suggests that the overall risk appetite of banks 
could be low.
Figure 8: Total bank assets (% GDP), 1999Q1-2018Q2  
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (total banks assets: BSI.M.*.N.A.T00.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E) and Eurostat (GDP: [namq_10_gdp]).
3.2 Risk-weighted assets 
Risk-weighted assets relative to total assets is a direct regulatory measure of the risks taken by 
banks. The safer the asset, the lower the risk weight, with the safest assets having a zero risk weight. 
There is an important exception, however. Sovereign bonds are weighted with zero weight 
in EU regulations and thereby the EU does not comply with Basel III. The zero risk weight 
of sovereign securities in bank portfolios implies that if the share of such securities on bank 
balance sheets increases – a phenomenon that was observed in the crisis years in a number 
of countries – the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets will decline, even if sovereign 
securities carry risk8.
Figure 9 shows that in a number of countries the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
assets either continues to decline or remains broadly stable. The notable exceptions are 
Greece, where a steady increase since early 2015 can be observed. Since Figure 9 considers 
the total balance sheet, in the Annex we separate out only those balance sheet items that are 
8   “Exposures to Member States’ central governments, and central banks denominated and funded in the domestic 
currency of that central government and central bank shall be assigned a risk weight of 0 %” (CRR, article 114(4)). See 
more details in Annex I of Véron (2017). 
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subject to credit, counterparty credit, dilution and delivery risks (Figure 15 in the Annex). 
The conclusion from this narrower aggregate largely mimics the results from the total assets: 
riskiness is either declining or remains broadly stable, with only minor increases observed in 
some countries. Interestingly, while total risk-weighted assets are increasing in Greece, the 
assets exposed to credit, counterparty credit, dilution and delivery risks are not.
Figure 9: Risk-weighted bank assets (% total bank assets), 2008Q4-2018Q1  
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (RWA: CBD2.Q.*.W0.11._Z._Z.A.A.I4011._Z._Z._Z._Z._Z._Z.PC). Note: lower value 
indicates lower risk.
The possible reasons for the fall in risk-weighted assets could be:
• Compositional (eg increased shares of sovereign exposure in banks’ portfolios);
• The credit-rating upgrade of companies, which might result from impact of the improved overall 
economic outlook on company outlook;
• NPLs are gradually being worked down, which also reduces the riskiness of bank balance sheets;
• Many banks are still in a deleveraging phase (Figure 8) and these banks might reduce their riskier 
exposures first in order to improve their capital adequacy; 
• Some banks could be still cautious, eg an ECB survey9 found that one reason for hoarding 
excess liquidity is that banks’ investment decisions remain subject to strict internal risk limits; and
• The implementation of new regulations. For example, the Basel III regulation introduced 
9   The ECB conducted a survey of 68 bank treasurers about their excess liquidity holdings. Details are presented in 
Baldo et al (2017).
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a global liquidity requirement framework which encompasses the liquidity requirement 
ratio (LCR) as well as the net stable funding ratio (NSFR).
Therefore, the overall conclusion from the regulatory risk weights is that the riskiness of 
bank balance sheets – as reflected in micro-prudential credit weights – has either declined or 
remained broadly stable during the period of ultra-loose monetary policy.
3.3 Bank lending growth and levels
Previous episodes of high risk-taking by banks were often characterised by strong growth 
of bank lending. While the issuance of loans is strongly pro-cyclical, it is crucial to monitor 
whether lending becomes excessive and therefore poses the risk of creating a bubble. Figure 
10 shows that there has been a general increase in the overall lending growth rate throughout 
the euro area, with the exception of Greece where credit growth is still negative. There is a 
significant variation between euro-area countries, both in terms of level and dynamics. In terms 
of levels, lending growth ranges from minus 1 percent in Greece to 14 percent in Malta, with the 
average euro-area value at 3 percent. In terms of dynamics, most countries see a steady increase 
in credit growth rates, yet in the Netherlands, Estonia and Finland lending growth rates peaked 
in 2016 or early 2017 and there has been a decline since then. Therefore, the observation of 
Merler (2015) about the diverging financial cycles of euro-area countries continues to apply. 
Figure 10: Annual growth rates nominal bank lending to euro area (% change 
compared to the same month of the previous year), 2007Q1-2018Q2
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (lending: BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.0000.Z01.E and BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.4.U2.0000.
Z01.E). Note: Outstanding stocks are calculated based on flows and stock level in 2013 Q4; 4-quarter moving average.
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We also looked at the two main components of lending: to households (Figure 16 in the 
Annex) and to non-financial corporations (NFCs) (Figure 17 in the Annex). For household 
loans we also indicate the historical growth rates observed during housing boom periods. 
Thus, the difference between a country’s growth rate and this historical benchmark serves 
as a risk indicator of whether a country potentially faces a real-estate bubble.
Household loan growth remains subdued in most euro-area countries, which is in line 
with our earlier finding that in most euro-area countries, banks are still in a deleveraging 
phase. In particular, banks in southern euro-area countries are reducing their loans 
to households in real terms. Bank loans to French, German and Dutch households 
increased at an average annual rate of around 3-5 percent between 2013 and 2018, which 
is well below the suggested real-estate bubble trajectory.   
However, there are two key exceptions, Belgium and Slovakia, where bank lending 
to households has increased rather rapidly recent years, similarly to previous run-ups 
to real-estate bubbles. This might suggest a potential danger. However, credit standards 
have actually been tightened significantly in Slovakia and somewhat in Belgium for 
household loans (Figure 18), implying that banks aim to contain their risks.  
Figure 11: Loans to households in the euro area (% of GDP), July 2018
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (lending: BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.2250.Z01.E) and Eurostat (GDP: nama_10_
gdp). Note: based on GDP in 2017.
Moreover, the indebtedness of both countries’ households is still below the euro-area 
average (Figure 11) and therefore the increase in indebtedness might not lead to excessive 
household debt. And, this increased lending has not (yet) translated into a significant increase 
in house prices in Belgium (Figure 12 in section 3.4), again suggesting that the situation might 
not be a bubble. However, there has been rapid house-price inflation in Slovakia.
Bank lending to non-financial corporations measured at constant pricescontinues to 
contract in Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, 
while in the other euro-area countries the growth rates in excess of inflation are below 
4 percent per year on average, which does not seem disproportionate in relation to the 
observed increase in economic activity (Figure 17). These developments suggest again that 
the speed of credit growth is not excessive.
3.4 Housing markets 
The housing market has frequently been a source of financial instability. When a rapid house-
price increase is fuelled by credit growth, an unexpected reversal of house prices might render 
borrowers insolvent, causing bank losses. Figure 12 shows that in some countries the house-price 
growth rate is not far from what was witnessed during the build-up of past real-estate bubbles. In 
Ireland, the growth rate since 2013Q4 is outperforming earlier house-price booms. The growth 
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rate is also relatively fast in countries including Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Slovakia. The 
rapid growth of house prices should be a concern from the perspective of financial stability, but as 
we indicated in the section 3.3, these house-price increases are not boosted by lending growth in 
most countries, which implies that the financial stability implications of an eventual house-price 
bust would be less severe. Of these five countries, bank credit standards for household loans have 
been loosened only in Luxembourg since 2014, but has been tightened in the other four countries 
(Figure 18), suggesting again that banks might aim to contain their risks.
Figure 12: Real house price index (2013Q4=100), 2009Q1-2018Q1
Source: Bruegel based on OECD (Real house price indices, seasonally adjusted); Boom growth rates based on Rostagno et al (2016) 
estimates. Note: Real house price index unavailable for Cyprus and Malta.
3.5 Home bias 
Before the global financial crisis, many euro-area banks increased their exposure to other 
euro-area countries, non-euro EU countries and also non-EU countries. From a financial 
stability point of view this diversification was desirable, because it diversified the risks that 
banks face and an eventual downturn of the home economy (which still remains the most 
significant exposure of banks) would have a lesser impact on bank balance sheets. However, 
this trend reversed in most countries after the start of the global (2007) and euro-area (2010) 
crises and the reversal has continued in more recent periods. Thus, the exposure of banks to 
their home countries has increased, raising concerns about concentration of risk.
Ireland, Slovenia and Spain are exceptions to this trend, though the concentration in 
Spain and Slovenia (93 percent of euro-area loans are granted to the home economy) remain 
very high; less so in Ireland (68 percent). While the drivers for banks in Ireland and Slovenia 
are mainly their lending to monetary financial institutions (MFI) in other euro-area countries, 
Spanish banks supplied more loans to the foreign private sector.
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Figure 13: Home bias: bank loans to domestic sector (% total loans to euro area), 
1999Q1-2018Q2
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (domestic loans: BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.1.U6.2000.Z01.E and total loans to euro 
area: BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.0000.Z01.E). Note: Resident credit institutions include resident branches of institutions headquartered 
abroad, but exclude foreign branches of resident institutions. 
Similarly to loans, the bias towards domestic debt securities gradually declined during the 
expansionary periods of the early 2000s, but increased sharply with the financial crisis around 
2007-12. However, this trend reversed for central European countries around 2013 and for 
most southern European countries one year later when the banking sector started to increase 
the shares it held of non-euro dominated debt securities. A possible reason for this could be 
monetary tightening in the US, UK and other non-euro area countries, which increased the 
yields of those countries’ fixed-income securities. 
It is interesting to note that the general holdings of debt securities have decreased 
significantly both in nominal terms and measured as a share of total assets10. Banks in 
Germany, France and the Netherlands reduced their domestic debt securities holdings 
as a share of total assets from around 20 percent in 2010 to close to 13 percent in 2018. 
The accumulation of excess reserves as a result of the ECB’s liquidity injections in these 
jurisdictions could be one possible explanation. However, Italy and Spain, where the banking 
10 Valuation effects play an important role when analysing bank balance sheet items such as debt securi-
ties. The ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse also provides an index of the respective items, which controls 
for changes in prices (debt securities issued by MFIs: BSI.M.*.N.A.A30.A.I.U6.1000.Z01.A and non-MFIs: 
BSI.M.*.N.A.A30.A.I.U6.2000.Z01.A). These indices confirm an active reduction in domestic debt securities of 
banks in Italy and Spain since 2014 and German and French banks since 2011. See series mentioned above for 
details for other countries.
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sectors only started to hold excess liquidity from the end of 2016, scaled down their holdings 
of debt securities from 24 percent and 20 percent respectively to 17 percent in both cases. This 
however, is still well above the pre-crisis level of 10 percent. 
Thus, although home bias in debt securities holdings increased sharply in the aftermath 
of the crisis, banks in most countries are not only reducing holdings of domestically issued 
bonds but also their debt securities holdings overall, potentially as a result of ECB liquidity 
provision.
Figure 14: Bank’s domestic debt securities holdings (% total debt securities), 
1999Q1-2018Q2
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (debt securities issued by domestic non-MFIs: BSI.M.*.N.A.A30.A.1.U6.2000.
Z01.E and MFIs: BSI.M.*.N.A.A30.A.1.U6.1000.Z01.E; total debt securities:  BSI.M.*.N.A.A30.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E). Note: Resident credit 
institutions include resident branches of institutions headquartered abroad, but exclude foreign branches of resident institutions.
3.6 Macroprudential assessments 
Macroprudential reports by national authorities suggest that the overall risk to financial stability 
remains low, though they highlight certain vulnerabilities. While most reports signal that one 
would expect greater broad-based risk-taking under the current monetary framework, little 
evidence of such behaviour is put forward. Many reports consider one of the main risks of the 
current low interest rate environment for banks/financial system to be an abrupt price reversal. 
In some countries certain vulnerabilities have been highlighted and macroprudential 
measures adopted. For example, countercyclical capital buffers (CCyBs)11 were adopted in 
11 The CCyB is aimed to strengthen the banks’ resilience in the event of an increase in the cyclical systemic risks (eg 
in the case of excessive credit growth).
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France, Ireland and Slovakia. The capital buffer for other systemically important institutions 
(O-SIIs) was increased in almost all countries with notable exceptions of Italy and Spain 
(Table 2). We also noted (Section 3.1) that Italian and Spanish banks are still in a rapid 
deleveraging phase.
It also important to highlight that the Belgian and the German reports argued that risk-
weighted assets (RWA) and other indicators might not sufficiently reflect inherent risks or 
might overlook systemic risks.
Table 2: Implemented or proposed macroprudential instruments in 2018
Macroprudential measures
Belgium Additional measures targeting the real estate market (buffer amounting 
to €1.5 billion of common equity Tier 1 capital)
CCyB kept at 0%
Buffers from 0.75% to 1.5% for systematically important banks 
Finland Systemic risk buffer between 3%-1.5% for Nordea, Op Group and 
Municipality Finance Plc and 1% for other Finnish credit institutions 
(July 2019) 
France Capping exposure of systematically important French banks to large, 
highly indebtedness domestic companies to 5% of eligible capital (July 
2018)
CCyB to be set at the moderate rate of 0.25% (July 2019)
Germany Capital buffer for systemically important institutions (2% of risk 
exposure); implementation by January 2019
CCyB kept at 0%
Ireland CCyB to be raised to 1% (in July 2019)
Capital buffer for systemically important institutions to take effect 
in 2019, ranging from 0 to 0.5% and rising to 1.5% by 2021 for certain 
banks
Mortgage-specific measures remain in place, slightly tightened (20% of 
the value of new mortgage lending to first-time borrowers and 10% of 
the value of lending to second/subsequent-borrowers can be above the 
loan-to-income cap (currently 3.5)
Italy No change: CCyB kept at 0%
Netherlands Advised further reduction of loan-to-value ratio (LTV) from 100% (no 
time frame)
No change to CCyB (kept at 0%)
Slovakia CCyB increased to 12.5% from August 2018, up from 0.5% from August 
2017
A capital conservation buffer (CCoB) – fully phased in since 1 October 
2014
Capital buffer for systemically important institutions– being phased in 
between 2016 and 2018
Debt-to-income (DTI) ratio limits and tighter loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 
limits
Spain No change (CCyB kept at 0%)
Source: Bruegel based on Banca d’Italia (2018), Banco de España (2018), Banque de France (2018), Bundesbank (2017), Central Bank of 
Ireland (2018a,b), De Nederlandsche Bank (2018), Národná banka Slovenska (2018) and National Bank of Belgium (2018).
We take a closer look at Belgium, Ireland and Slovakia, three countries for which we have 
identified rapid credit or house-price growth in recent years. In our assessment, the three 
central banks have adopted appropriate measures to address the underlying risks. 
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Belgium
The National Bank of Belgium’s Financial Stability Report (2018) argues that “The robust 
financial position of the Belgian financial sector also provides a solid foundation to tackle 
major, and more structural, challenges in the future, such as the current low interest rate 
environment and the uncertainty surrounding a possible shift in monetary policy…” (page 7). 
Notwithstanding this overall positive assessment, the report highlights the process of 
broad-based risk-taking resulting from low interest rates: “In their search for yield to offset 
this downward pressure on profitability, Belgian banks are gradually opting to take on more 
interest rate and credit exposures, using higher maturity transformation and fixed-rate loan 
volumes as potential ways of compensating (at least partly) for the downward pressure on the 
net interest income margin stemming from repricing in fixed-income assets. Banks are also 
gearing their business models towards activities that generate non-interest income, particularly 
fees and commissions related to asset management business, which may expose them to step-in 
and reputational risks.” (page 63)
Concerning the real-estate sector, the report argues that “Exposure to mortgage loans remains 
high while the inherent risks are not necessarily sufficiently reflected in the microprudential risk 
weighting. On average, mortgage loans represent around 20% of the banking sector’s total assets, 
while loan growth remains dynamic. Furthermore, a portion of these loans is risky.” (page 8).
While the report argues that “there are currently no signs of any excessive accumulation of 
risks” (page 8) and thereby the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) is kept at 0 percent, two 
other measures have been introduced: 
• The requirement to create a buffer amounting to about €1.5 billion, made up of common 
equity Tier 1 capital (CET 1), to tame the risk coming from the strong mortgage credit 
growth rate, the increase in the Belgian household indebtedness ratio, a possible 
moderate overvaluation of property and a certain relaxation of lending standards; and
• Capital surcharges ranging from 0.75 percent to 1.50 percent depending on the systemic 
importance of the bank, to contain systemic risk.
Ireland
As we noted in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, Ireland is experiencing a very rapid increase in house 
prices but without an expansion of credit. While the Central Bank of Ireland (2018b) 
concludes that both the level of house prices and the loan/income ratio of households are 
currently in line with economic fundamentals12, it sees the potential of excessive increases if 
recent trends continue:
• House prices: “house prices having gone from being below what might have been 
expected given macroeconomic developments to now being roughly in line with economic 
fundamentals. Accordingly, the cyclical risk of house prices moving ahead of fundamental 
values is now more elevated than in recent years.” (page 2);
• Household credit: “The sustained contraction in credit seen for much of the last decade 
ended in recent months. While aggregate credit growth is close to zero, continued 
deleveraging in the SME and buy-to-let sectors obscures positive growth in home loans, 
consumer lending and loans to large enterprises. … Research indicated that the ratio of 
new mortgages lending to household income in Ireland to be broadly consistent with key 
structural factors. However, a significant acceleration in the new lending would increase the 
cyclical risk.” (page 2).
With a view to this potential real-estate market vulnerability, and with the risk of a more 
general build-up of cyclical systemic risk, which might potentially arise “from an external 
12  See a more detailed assessment in Central Bank of Ireland (2018a).
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shock” (page 1), the Central Bank of Ireland (2018b) has increased the CCyB rate on Irish 
exposures from 0 percent to 1 percent effective from 5 July 2019.
Slovakia
Slovakia is the only euro-area country in which total banks assets are expanding as a share 
of GDP (Figure 8), though from a low level, and thus the annual growth rate of bank credit is 
relatively high at 10 percent in June 2018. Among the two main components of credit, household 
credit is growing at very dynamic rate, similarly to historical credit booms (Figure 16).
Národná banka Slovenska (2018) concludes that “Housing loan growth in Slovakia 
remains the highest in the EU and indebtedness is elevated. Household borrowing growth 
is outpacing economic fundamentals.” (page 18). These developments are assessed as the 
principal risk to financial stability. In terms of the reasons for these developments, the report 
cites both demand and supply factors. Demand is boosted by “the exceptionally benign 
macroeconomic environment, and in particular by the gradual overheating of the labour 
market” (page 18). Increased supply is related to the low interest rate environment: “Lending 
growth is closely related to interest margin compression” (page 41), because banks robustly 
increase their lending in order to offset the impact of falling interest margins, primarily driven 
by significant banks, given that less significant banks have a weaker competitive position due 
to their higher credit risk and higher cost of funding.
Furthermore, the report concludes that “Compared with the past, liquidity risk has 
increased to an elevated level. The rapid rise in total loans – assets that are predominantly long-
term and illiquid – is to a large extent funded by customer deposit.” (page 7). 
As a result, the Národná banka Slovenska has introduced a number of macroprudential 
measures to address the risks from low interest rates and the impact of accommodative 
monetary policies13: 
• A capital conservation buffer (CCoB) – fully phased in since 1 October 2014;
• An additional capital buffer requirement applied to O-SII banks on grounds of their 
systemic importance – being phased in between 2016 and 2018;
• The introduction of a non-zero countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) rate of 0.5 percent 
from 1 August 2017, rising to 1.25 percent from 1 August 2018; and
• Introduction of debt-to-income (DTI) ratio limits and tighter loan-to-value (LTV) ratio 
limits – which entered into force on 1 July 2018.
4 Concluding remarks
Low interest rates, which partly result from the ECB’s negative deposit facility interest rate 
and large-scale asset purchases, act as a drag on bank profitability, given that such monetary 
policy measures narrow the spread between short-term and long-term rates and the spread 
between banks’ lending and deposit rates. At the same time, excess liquidity held by banks at 
the Eurosystem exceeded €1,900 billion, or 17 percent of euro-area GDP, in September 2018. 
This involves direct costs for banks given that the ECB charges its negative interest rate on excess 
liquidity. These impacts might create incentives for banks to engage in risky lending. 
However, our analysis reveals a more nuanced picture. Euro-area excess liquidity is not 
extraordinary in a global context and is in fact small compared to Japan, Switzerland and the 
United States. It is highly concentrated in a few countries and in a few banks and thus cannot be 
an incentive for countries and banks that hold very little, but only for those that hold a lot. The 
direct cost of holding excess liquidity as a share of bank equity is relatively low in most euro-area 
13  See page 8 of Národná banka Slovenska (2018).
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countries, though noteworthy for some. And if it did provide an incentive for greater risk-taking, 
it would already have been demonstrated through bank lending to riskier businesses, but we 
do not observe such developments in most of the euro area. Therefore, we conclude that excess 
liquidity is not the best indicator to represent the incentives banks have to take on more risk.
Our analysis of bank lending suggests muted risks. The overall credit growth rate in the 
euro area was a mere three percent in July 2018 (compared to the same month of the previous 
year), which is below the growth rate of nominal GDP. In most euro-area countries banks 
are still deleveraging, implying that their risk appetites could be low. However, the euro area 
remains heterogeneous in terms of the financial cycle and there are a few countries where 
either the rate of credit growth or the rate of house-price increases has accelerated. Our review 
of macroprudential reports by national central banks suggests that various aspects of the risks 
have been carefully analysed at the national level and various macroprudential measures have 
been introduced in several countries to tame potential risks to financial stability. 
The more general question that arises from our study is that, notwithstanding the overall 
relatively low risks to financial stability, should the ECB use its monetary policy instruments 
to foster financial stability objectives, which in the current situation would imply a monetary 
tightening? Our answer is no, for the reasons discussed in Claeys and Darvas (2015). The 
main monetary policy instrument, the interest rate, is too broad as an instrument, and 
ultimately quite ineffective in dealing with the build-up of financial imbalances, as the 
literature demonstrates14. The heterogeneous financial cycles of euro-area countries also 
make the use of monetary policy (which cannot be differentiated by member state) an 
ill-suited instrument to deal with financial-sector vulnerabilities. Instead, monetary policy 
should focus on its primary mandate of area-wide price stability, and other policies should 
be deployed whenever the financial cycle deviates from the economic cycle, or when 
heterogeneous financial developments in the euro area require financial tightening in some 
but not all countries. These policies include micro-prudential supervision, macro-prudential 
oversight, fiscal policy and regulation of sectors that pose risks to financial stability, such as 
construction.
Finally, we note that the winding-down of excess liquidity is a remote prospect at the 
moment, because the ECB has already indicated that in the foreseeable future it aims to 
reinvest the maturing assets it has purchased, which will stabilise the level of excess liquidity 
once large-scale asset purchases end. But that reinvestment strategy will (likely) be stopped 
at some point when the ECB will allow its balance sheet to shrink, which will lead to a gradual 
reduction of excess liquidity. This might cause problems for banks that heavily rely on excess 
liquidity to meet the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) requirement and might raise financial 
stability concerns. Macroprudential authorities should require such banks to present 
contingency plans showing how they will address this issue.
14  See for example Bean et al (2010), Nelson et al (2015), Posen (2009) and Svensson (2014).
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ANNEX
Figure 15: Risk-weighted exposure for credit, counterparty credit, dilution and 
delivery risks assets (% total risk exposure), 2008Q4-2018Q1
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (CBD2.Q.*.W0.11._Z._Z.A.A.I4210._Z._Z._Z._Z._Z._Z.PC).
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Figure 16: Bank lending to households at constant prices (2013Q4=100), 2009Q1-
2018Q2
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (lending: BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.2250.Z01.E and BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.4.U2.2250.
Z01.E, HICP: ICP.M.*.N.XEF000.4.INX); Boom growth rates based on Rostagno et al (2016) estimates. Note: Outstanding stocks of loans have 
been deflated using HICP. We calculate the nominal outstanding stock of loans stocks from financial transaction (to exclude the impact of 
reclassifications) by cumulating transactions compared to the actual stock level in 2013Q4. Since HICP has seasonal components, we use 
a 4-quarter moving average of the HICP index to deflate the nominal loan stock.
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Figure 17: Bank lending to non-financial corporations at constant prices 
(2013Q4=100), 2009Q1-2018Q2
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (lending: BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.2240.Z01.E and BSI.M.*.N.A.A20.A.4.U2.2240.
Z01.E, HICP: ICP.M.*.N.XEF000.4.INX). Note: Outstanding stocks of loans have been deflated using HICP. We calculate the nominal outstanding 
stock of loans stocks from financial transaction (to exclude the impact of reclassifications) by cumulating transactions compared to the 
actual stock level in 2013Q4. Since HICP has seasonal components, we use a 4-quarter moving average of the HICP index to deflate the 
nominal loan stock.
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Figure 18: Net tightening of credit standards applied to new household loans, 
2004Q1-2018Q3
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (BLS.Q.*.ALL.Z.H.H.B3.ST.S.FNET and BLS.Q.*.ALL.Z.H.H.B3.ST.S.BFNET).
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Figure 19: Net tightening of credit standards applied to new enterprise loans, 
2004Q1-2018Q3
Source: Bruegel based on ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (BLS.Q.*.ALL.O.E.Z.B3.ST.S.FNET and BLS.Q.*.ALL.O.E.Z.B3.ST.S.BFNET). 
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